Q:      In previous columns you have stated that state court receivers in California have quasi-judicial immunity. However, the cases cited were either unreported cases or cases where the party being sued was not a receiver, but a different functionary. Are there any reported California cases that explicitly hold that a state court receiver has quasi-judicial immunity?

A:      You are correct that California cases, up to now, that said state court receivers have quasi-judicial immunity were either unreported [Haider v. Speiser, 2012 WL 4101944 (2012), where the defendant was actually a referee, but the court said he took acts as a receiver, which the court approved, and Gruntz v. Wiley, 2009 WL 4264343 (2009), where the defendant was a special master, but the plaintiffs contended he was acting as a receiver], or were cases where the courts listed the types of functionaries who have quasi-judicial immunity, including receivers, but the cases themselves did not involve a receiver [Holt v. Brock, 85 Cal. App. 5th 611 (2022) [partition referee] and Howard v. Drapkin, 222 Cal. App. 3d 843 (1990) [court appointed psychologist]. The broad language used in those cases, however, clearly covered receivers: “Thus we believe it appropriate that these 'nonjudicial persons who fulfill quasi-judicial functions intimately related to the judicial process' should be given absolute quasi-judicial immunity for damage claims arising from their performance of duties in connection with the judicial process.” Holt, supra, at 901 (citations omitted).

          A new case, involving a receiver, has now declared: “We hold that a court-appointed receiver is protected by quasi-judicial immunity for the receiver’s discretionary acts and decisions.” Semaan v. Mosier, 118 Cal. App. 5th 460, 465 (2026) (“Semaan”).  The Semaan receivership arose out of a criminal case involving insurance fraud. A receiver was appointed under California’s aggravated white collar crime enhancement law, Penal Code §186.11. The court subsequently ordered the receiver to liquidate into cash all stock that had been seized “as soon as practicable” after the signing of the order. Six weeks later, the receiver had not sold the stock. Instead, he filed a petition for instructions stating TDAmeritrade had imposed unreasonable requirements on his selling the stock. He also explained he was reluctant to start the liquidation process because he was advised the defendant’s brother was selling a building to pay all the defendant’s financial liability. In response, the court replaced the receiver with a different receiver.

          The receiver filed his final report. The defendant objected to it and sought permission to sue the receiver for not selling the stock as ordered. The court ruled it would not maintain jurisdiction over a civil lawsuit (likely because it was a criminal department) and was not making any ruling or finding on whether the receiver was liable for not selling the stock. [It is not clear from the opinion whether the court granted permission allowing the defendant to sue the receiver elsewhere or whether the court approved the receiver’s final report and discharged him, which could act as res judicata to bar defendant’s claims.]

          The defendant then sued the receiver for approximately $1.18 million, the reduction in the stock’s value from the date of the court’s liquidation order to the date the receiver was replaced. In response, the receiver filed an anti-SLAPP motion (Code of Civil Procedure §425.16). The motion was granted, because the trial court found the claims arose out of protected activity, as they fell within the course of the receiver’s appointment, and plaintiff had not shown its claims had the requisite minimum merit, because the receiver was protected by quasi-judicial immunity and the litigation privilege. Plaintiff then appealed.

          The appellate opinion starts by explaining anti-SLAPP motions are resolved through a two-step analysis. First, the defendant bears the burden of showing the challenged conduct arises out of protected activity. If the defendant meets that burden, then the second step shifts the burden to the plaintiff to demonstrate the claims have at least “minimal merit”. The court ruled plaintiff had forfeited any argument about the first step because it did not directly address the issue in its brief. California Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B) requires that every appellate brief: “[s]tate each point under a separate heading or subheading summarizing the point and support each point by argument.” The headings in plaintiff’s brief only addressed the second step of the analysis. Nevertheless, the court found that the claims arose out of the receiver’s conduct, that was a protected activity, because it was conduct in furtherance of the constitutional right of petition or free speech in connection with a public issue. In this case, the criminal prosecution.

          The court then addressed the second step, finding the claims did not have minimal merit because the receiver had quasi-judicial immunity. In so finding, the court relied on and cited the Holt and Howard decisions supra, as well as numerous federal cases that also hold receivers have quasi-judicial immunity. “Absent broad immunity, receivers would be 'a lightning rod for harassing litigation aimed at judicial orders.'” New Alaska Dev. Corp. v. Guetschow 869 F.2d 1289,1303 (9th Cir. 1989). It adopted the arguments and holdings in those cases that: “Without immunity, receivers would be less likely to accept court appointments and the implied threat of liability could affect their decisionmaking process.” Semaan, surpa. at 473 (citations omitted).   

          Having found receivers have immunity, the court then addressed the extent of the immunity. It ruled because one reason for granting immunity is to promote uninhibited and independent decisionmaking, the immunity “is limited to discretionary (nonministeral) acts and decisions, that is 'when they use their judgment or discretion in performing their jobs'.” Id. (citations omitted). It also held immunity would not extend to intentional misconduct. Id.

          Under the facts of the case, the receiver was immune because the court had ordered him to sell the stock “as soon as practicable”. Hence, the receiver had to make a decision when it was practicable to sell. The court notes: “Quasi-judicial immunity protects both right and wrong decisions”. Id. at 474.   

          It is unfortunate the court focused on only one of the stated reasons for granting receivers immunity: to promote uninhibited and independent decision making, and ignored the other reason: without broad immunity receivers would be less likely to accept appointments. In doing so it tries to parse when immunity applies, by distinguishing discretionary acts and decisions from ministerial acts, without defining what would constitute a ministerial act - resulting in no immunity. Some cases state: “ministerial decisions are essentially automatic based on whether certain fixed standards and objective measurements have been met.” Calvert v. County of Yuba, 145 Cal. App. 4th 613, 623 (2006) (citations omitted). Examples could include: the renewal of a driver’s license if the written exam is passed and the fee paid; the issuance of a dog license if proof of vaccination and the fee is paid; or the issuance of a typical, small-scale building permit, if all objective standards have been met. Id. at 622. However, the distinction between a ministerial act and a discretionary act can be quite narrow and clouded. As has been noted, it can be a “semantic thicket’ and “it would be difficult to conceive of any official act, no matter how directly ministerial, that did not admit some discretion in the manner of its performance, even if it involved only the driving of a nail.” Johnson v. State, 69 Cal. 2d 782, 788 (1968).

          In a receivership it is hard to conceive of any but the most specifically ordered act that would be ministerial. Almost everything a receiver does is discretionary: managing property; deciding when, how and to whom to list or sell assets; bringing or defending lawsuits; hiring agents; bringing property up to code; collecting debts; preserving assets for the parties. All these functions and duties require evaluating risks, weighing facts and competing interests, timing, and the exercise of judgment. A ministerial act would have to be one that requires no discretion on the receiver’s part. For example, if the court in Semaan had ordered the receiver to sell the stock immediately at the market price, instead of “as soon as practicable” or if a court ordered a receiver to transfer specific property to someone immediately. If, however, any discretion exists, as Semaan itself shows, the receiver would have immunity.

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