Q: I am involved in pending litigation and would like to get a receiver appointed. The facts of the case, however, don’t exactly fit into the types of cases enumerated in Cal. Civ. Pro. Code §564(b). Is there some other bases for getting a receiver appointed?

A: Depending on the facts, there are many types of cases where a receiver can be appointed that are not specified in §564(b). Many are statutory. For example: to enforce an order of the family court, Cal. Fam. Code §290; to deal with health and safety code violations, Cal. Health & Safety Code § 17980(c); in unfair competition cases,  Cal. Bus. & Professions Code §17203; upon the filing of a complaint for involuntary dissolution of a corporation, Cal. Corp. Code §6513; to manage a long term health care facility, Cal. Health & Safety Code §1327; in escheat proceedings, Cal. Civ. Pro. Code § 1422; after judgment, to sell a liquor license, Cal. Civ. Pro. Code § 708.630(b) and in aid of execution, Cal. Civ. Pro. Code §708.620, among others.

          While not apparent, Cal. Civ. Pro.Code §564(b)(9) can be a basis for appointing a receiver, if a receiver was previously appointed in a case with your fact pattern or claims. Section 564(b)(9) states a receiver can be appointed: “In all other cases where necessary to preserve the property or rights of any party.” This language is the result of an amendment to the statute in 2001. Prior to the amendment the statute read (then §(b)(8)): “where receivers have heretofore been appointed by the usages of courts of equity.” The Law Revision Commission Comments to §564 make clear that the language change was merely made “to insert more readily understandable language” and, importantly: “This is not a substantive change.” As a result, if you can find a similar case where a court appointed a receiver you can legitimately argue the court has the ability to do so in your case. Some examples where this section has been used include: Takeba v. Superior Court, 43 Cal. App. 469 (1919) where a receiver was appointed to preserve perishable property pending litigation; McLame v. Placerville & S.V.R.Co., 66 Cal. 606 (1885), appointing a receiver to take possession of property that was subject to a trust. It can also serve a statutory basis for the appointment of an ancillary receiver, along with comity. Recently, a court relied on the section, in a nuisance case, to appoint a receiver to take possession of and demolish a “megamansion” built without required permits and unsafe to homes on the hillside below it. Had the city acted, a receiver likely could have been appointed under Cal. Health & Safety Code § 17980.7. But, because the city had failed to take action, the down slope neighbors sued for fraud and nuisance and obtained the appointment. Bedrosian v. Hadid, 2021 WL 821504 (2021).

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